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While these studies provide compelling evidence for an enhanced 
memory of stimuli which induce moderately negative emotions, 
this is not necessarily true for two problematic cases involving 
extremely negative emotions: the emergence of an unconscious 
conflict, which is subject to repression, and traumatic events that 
overstress a person’s executive capabilities and thus lead to disso-
ciation. As a result, conscious recall of these contents is impaired, 
but they continue to exert an unconscious effect which dramati-
cally influences subsequent life – for example, by uncontrollably 
occurring intrusions and dissociative flashbacks, panic attacks, or 
psychosomatic symptoms (see Box 1). In other instances, victims of 
a traumatic experience may be able to recall details from the trauma, 
but only in a contorted manner – for example, from a detached 
view outside of themselves, or without the associated emotions. 
These symptoms of people which have suffered from real traumatic 
experiences are subsumed under the diagnosis of post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD; F43.1, ICD-10, World Health Organization, 
1992; DSM-IV-TR, American Psychiatric Association, 2000; Elbert 
and Schauer, 2002; Maercker, 2009).
Therapeutic interventions on patients suffering from symp-
toms due to repressed conflicts or traumatic experiences require 
an understanding of the mechanisms of repression and dissocia-
tion, not only on the psychological but also on the neurophysi-
ological level (for the general benefit of cognitive neuroscience 
IntroductIon
The current cognitive neurosciences have already revealed some 
mechanisms underlying the modulation of memory performance. 
However, several phenomena occurring in natural memory like 
memory distortions due to repression and due to trauma-related 
dissociations have not been adequately addressed yet by neuro-
cognitive research.
Many studies have shown convincingly that emotionally arous-
ing stimuli are better remembered than neutral images (Heuer and 
Reisberg, 1990; Bradley et al., 1992; Christianson, 1992; Ochsner, 
2000; Buchanan and Lovallo, 2001; Kensinger and Corkin, 2003). 
This effect depends on a facilitation of hippocampus-dependent 
memory processes by the amygdala (Seidenbecher et al., 2003; 
Dolcos et al., 2004; Kensinger and Corkin, 2004; Phelps, 2004; 
Smith et al., 2006; Figure 1A) and is related to the action of glu-
cocorticoids (Kim and Diamond, 2002; Sapolsky, 2003). Such an 
interaction between amygdala and hippocampus may be necessary 
for the enhanced declarative memory of emotional events because 
these two structures support complementary processes, as revealed 
by a hippocampal-amygdala double dissociation: While integrity 
of the hippocampus is necessary for the conscious memory that 
a particular stimulus was, during conditioning, associated with a 
shock, the amygdala is required for the unconsciously associated 
vegetative reaction (Bechara et al., 1995; LaBar et al., 1995).
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Figure 1 | emotional effects on memory. (A) Storage model of memory: 
Moderately arousing emotional events are better encoded than neutral events. 
(B) The narrative construction of a personal past relies on an interaction between 
the hippocampus and self-referential processes in the medial prefrontal cortex 
(mPFC). This process is facilitated by (moderately) emotional events due to inputs 
from the amygdala. (C) In contrast, in the case of extremely negative (conflictual 
or traumatic) experiences, the amygdala inhibits declarative memory formation 
by the hippocampus and an integration of these memories with the self-image.
There are at least two distinct processes leading to memory dis-
tortions in the case of problematic contents involving extremely 
negative emotions: repression and dissociation. Repression is the 
process by which internal conflicts are stored in the unconscious. 
Dissociation, on the other hand, is the process by which parts of 
external traumatic events are stored in a non-declarative memory 
system (see below). Repression is a typical defense mechanism 
thoroughly described by Freud to explain clinical symptoms such as 
neurotic depression or psychosomatic symptoms he observed in his 
patients. According to Freud, the starting point is an internal conflict 
arising when (mostly unconscious) wishes or drives are in a strict 
opposition to internalized norms or standards. If this conflict cannot 
be solved (e.g., because opposing elements cannot be integrated 
with self-referential processes), it automatically produces intense 
anxiety signaling danger for the subject (“Signalangst”). In an effort 
to avoid extremely negative emotions, the entire conflict and its 
associated emotions and memories are pushed into the unconscious 
(repression). This leads to a lack of declarative memory for the conflict 
and often the circumstances under which it emerged. The conflictual 
material itself, however, continues to exist in the unconscious and, 
more importantly, exerts a major influence on the subject by causing 
neurotic (e.g., depressed mood) or psychosomatic (e.g., paralyses) 
symptoms. According to Freud, the symptom is a symbolization of the 
internal conflict (for details, see Person et al., 2005). Dissociation is 
a process mainly investigated in the context of PTSD. When external 
traumata involving extremely negative emotions cannot be integrated 
with self-referential processes and no coherent narrative can be built, 
memories of this trauma become dissociated, i.e., they are stored in 
a system with no direct verbal access. Brewin (2001, 2003) uses the 
term “situationally accessible memory” to denote the memory sys-
tem where such dissociated elements are stored. Verbal memories 
of the traumatic event are often vague and include gaps. The contents 
stored in the SAM, on the other hand, are the source for situation-
ally triggered and hence not controllable intrusions and flashbacks 
typical for PTSD. Although distinct from the process of dissocia-
tion described here on a conceptual level, the clinical phenomena 
of “dissociations” in the traumatic situation (e.g., depersonalization, 
derealization) are empirically linked to the dissociation of memories 
in the SAM and hence the eventual development of a PTSD (Brewin 
and Holmes, 2003).
Box 1 | Memory distortions for problematic contents – repression and dissociation.
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(Promising Approaches for Studying Memory Distortions Due 
to Repression), we will suggest a paradigm for the investigation 
of memory distortions due to repression.
MeMory dIstortIons due to repressIon of an 
Internal conflIct
The concept of repression was originally suggested by Herbart 
(1824), but was introduced as a pathological process by Sigmund 
Freud (see Box 1). Most of his patients had symptoms that could 
not be explained by common logic or medical knowledge (e.g., 
paralyses of isolated limbs with no medical cause). In order to 
explain the etiology of such symptoms, he conceptualized the 
construct of repression as a mechanism being applied throughout 
child development. It means the storage of complete internal con-
flicts (mostly between drives or wishes and internalized norms or 
standards) and their surrounding emotions and memories in the 
unconscious (Freud, 1915). The developing child hence represses 
problematic content once an internal conflict is emergent. The 
classical view of repression as depicted in Box 1 was significantly 
advanced by an increased consideration of the child’s relationship 
to its parents and its developing self (Ferenczi, 1933; Balint, 1969). 
Internalization of a safe relationship to the parents is necessary for 
the development of agency and a stable self (Stern, 1985), and the 
infantile self is only developed through such parental feedback 
(Fonagy et al., 2005). In this new view, repression may occur when 
an internal conflict cannot be integrated with the image of the par-
ents and/or self-referential processes. It is hence mainly this prob-
lematic integration in self-referential processes that give conflicts 
their true “pathological” value and trigger repression as a means to 
cope with them for the moment. The price to pay for the relative 
peace the developing self obtains by repressing internal conflicts 
is high, though: Clinically, it is important that the repressed mate-
rial still exists in the unconscious and exerts a large influence on 
the subject by causing psychosomatic (e.g., paralyses) or neurotic 
(e.g., depressed mood) symptoms. The mechanism through which 
repressed conflicts gain access to the “outside” in the form of symp-
toms is called conversion (Breuer and Freud, 1895). By symbolizing 
the conflict or parts thereof in a symptomatic language, the patient 
can gain some relief at the price of clinical symptoms.
Although rooted in early twentieth century psychology and 
physiology, the concepts of repression and conversion via sym-
bolization are still of high clinical relevance for recent models of 
psychotherapy (for a current clinical textbook see Person et al., 
2005). Psychoanalytic therapies primarily working with the con-
cept of repression are highly effective in treating patients with 
severe psychiatric problems (e.g., chronic depression, personal-
ity disorders), as reviewed in a recent meta-analysis (Leichsenring 
and Rabung, 2008). The recent trend that problematic integra-
tion in self- referential processes is regarded as the main virulent 
component of repressed conflicts is reflected in newer manual-
ized psychodynamic treatments (e.g., Wöller and Kruse, 2010): 
The therapist should explicitly help the patient reorganize past 
experiences in a way that repressed conflicts can be integrated in 
self-referential processes. If successful, the patient not only gains 
clinical improvement on a symptomatic level (less or no need for 
conversion of an internal conflict in body symptoms), but also 
achieves a new and more coherent view of the self.
for understanding cognition see Henson, 2005; Axmacher et al., 
2009). A number of studies investigated brain regions activated 
during presentation of trauma-related cues in PTSD patients by 
functional MRI (for a review, see Shin et al., 2005). Other studies 
used MEG recordings to explore the neurophysiological basis of 
the “trauma network” in PTSD. Elbert and colleagues found that 
in these patients, processing of arousing stimuli (e.g., IAPS pic-
tures) relied more on a fast sensory processing pathway, which is 
uncoupled from prefrontal control, and less on elaborate process-
ing along the ventral visual stream (Rockstroh and Elbert, 2010). 
This may be due to a reduced connectivity with neural assemblies 
representing context-related (“cold”) and trauma-related (“hot”) 
information; as a result, trauma victims are unable to locate their 
trauma memories in time and space and experience them as flash-
backs (Elbert and Schauer, 2002). Psychotherapeutical treatment of 
PTSD patients (e.g., by narrative exposure therapy; Neuner et al., 
2004) aims at re-integrating this network by placing the traumatic 
memories in a coherent context. However, despite the incontestable 
value of such studies directly investigating PTSD patients, they 
are necessarily retrospective and do not allow for an experimen-
tal control of the emotionally disturbing situation itself. Several 
experimental paradigms have been developed to capture the proc-
esses occurring during PTSD-like memory distortions in healthy 
control subjects.
In this article, we will first describe memory distortions due 
to repression of internal conflicts (Memory Distortions Due to 
Repression of an Internal Conflict) and due to dissociation of 
external traumata (Memory Distortions Due to Dissociation After 
an External Trauma). In the Section “Experimental Paradigms of 
Repression,” we provide an overview of the experimental para-
digms currently used in the cognitive neurosciences to study 
the neural correlates of repression in healthy volunteers. We will 
argue that these paradigms do not convincingly operationalize 
repression because they fall short of capturing key aspects of 
this clinical phenomenon. Next, we will broaden our scope and 
demonstrate that the concept of memory itself usually implied 
in cognitive neuroscience studies represents only one aspect of 
real-life memory, but disregards others and is therefore unable 
to capture several complex features of memory (Storage and 
Constructive Models of Memory): The criteria for successful 
memory retrieval – namely accurate recollections of particu-
lar events – and the corresponding measures in the cognitive 
neurosciences such as analyses of subsequent memory effects 
only capture one relevant dimension of memory but disregard 
its constructive aspects. This becomes most obvious in stud-
ies of autobiographical memory, which involves integration of 
experiences with self-referential processes (Figure 1B). In the 
Section “Trauma-Related Memory Distortions Due to Lack of 
Self-Referential Processing,” we will argue that trauma-related 
memory distortions can only be adequately understood (and 
experimentally investigated) when they are conceptualized as a 
failure to construct autobiographical memories, i.e., to integrate 
these experiences with self-referential processes (Figure 1C). In 
other words, these memory distortions cannot be adequately 
understood as a failure to store memories, but as a failure to 
integrate them with self-referential processes. We will present a 
paradigm that takes these considerations into account. Finally 
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standpoint (e.g., Bremner and Brett, 1997; Lanius et al., 2002). 
The dual representation theory (Brewin, 2003) accounts for these 
trauma-related memory distortions by suggesting that memory 
contents can be encoded either via a hippocampus-dependent 
mechanism, which leads to a narrative integration of these contents 
with other experiences and makes them accessible for declarative 
recall (verbally accessible memory, VAM), or via an amygdala-
 dependent process, which does not allow for a conscious control 
of memory retrieval; however, unconscious experiences encoded 
by the amygdala are automatically recalled whenever an associated 
cue appears. According to the dual representation theory, this lat-
ter memory system has been described as situationally accessible 
memory (SAM). This theory further suggests that amygdala and 
hippocampus inhibit each other in the case of extremely negative 
events, such that the degree to which the amygdala supports encod-
ing of an event reduces the hippocampal contribution (Metcalfe 
and Jacobs, 1998; Brewin, 2001; Figure 1C). Indeed, functional 
MRI studies in PTSD patients indicate that recall of traumatic 
events is associated with an increased activation of the amygdala 
and a reduced activation of the hippocampus (Shin et al., 2005). 
Alternatively, it is possible that in this case the amygdala facilitates 
unconscious memory processes in the hippocampus (Henke et al., 
2003; Degonda et al., 2005).
Although the memory distortions described in psychoanalysis 
(repression) and in PTSD research (memory fragmentations and 
intrusions due to dissociation) appear to be very different at first 
sight, they converge in the idea that pathological forms of uncon-
scious memory replace declarative access to the problematic contents 
(Figure 2). In both cases, contents that are not verbally accessible 
(repressed conflicts or situationally accessible memories) exert a 
pathological influence on the subject by causing psychosomatic 
symptoms or intrusions and flashbacks, respectively. Thus, uncon-
scious memories are created that do not refer to familiarity-based 
recognition memory, but to memories that induce intrusions and 
flashbacks following a trauma or neurotic symptoms following a 
repressed conflict. As will be elaborated below, both phenomena gain 
their true pathological value by a failure to integrate the problematic 
contents (internal conflicts or traumata) in self-referential proc-
esses. Finally, successful treatment of both includes the integration 
of problematic contents in a more coherent self. Therefore, we sug-
gest that a common basis, or at least an overlap, exists for these two 
groups of phenomena, which might be defined in  neurobiological 
MeMory dIstortIons due to dIssocIatIon after an 
external trauMa
In contrast to the psychoanalytical focus on internal conflicts early 
in development, the concept of PTSD was primarily developed 
with regard to external later-life traumata, initially those during the 
Vietnam war. Memory distortions are, however, also among the main 
symptoms of PTSD. On the one hand, memories of the traumatic 
situation occur involuntarily as intrusions or even as flashbacks, in 
which patients do not remember the traumatic event as something 
past, but re-experience it as if it occurred again, similar to a dissocia-
tive state. On the other hand, declarative memory for details of the 
traumatic situation is often impaired (Brewin, 2007; Jones et al., 
2007): A large body of studies have reported general declarative 
memory deficits in PTSD patients (Clancy et al., 2000; Behrendt and 
Moritz, 2005; Jelinek et al., 2006; for a review, see Brewin, 2007), and 
in particular concerning verbal declarative memory (Yehuda et al., 
1995; Bremner et al., 2004). These memory impairments emphasize 
initial encoding and retention of new contents (Bremner, 2002), 
for instance, long lasting deficits in short-term memory have been 
shown in adults suffering from abuse during childhood (Bremner 
et al., 1995) as well as in Vietnam veterans diagnosed with PTSD 
(Bremner et al., 1993). Additionally, source memory referring to 
specific details of the traumatic event is often distorted in this 
population (Johnson et al., 1993). However, as we will elaborate 
below, the specific memory deformations following a trauma can 
be most accurately conceptualized not as failures to recall specific 
information, but as an impairment to integrate these experiences 
with self-referential processes, i.e., in the framework of constructiv-
ist memory theories (Trauma-Related Memory Distortions Due to 
Lack of Self-Referential Processing).
During the traumatic experience, limited time for conscious 
processing of accompanying sensory or vegetative perceptions 
inhibits an adequate integration thereof into autobiographical 
memory. This effect may depend on two mechanisms. First, an 
impaired processing of peripheral details during a traumatic situ-
ation due to a narrowing of the spotlight of attention is known 
as the weapon focusing effect (Christianson, 1992). This effect 
reduces the integration of all trauma-related information into a 
coherent representation. Second, traumatic experiences may be so 
overwhelming that the executive processing capabilities of trauma 
victims fail, leading to peri-traumatic dissociative states. In these 
states, subjects describe that they view themselves from a detached 
Figure 2 | Memory distortions caused by repressed conflicts (left) and 
traumatic experiences (right). Both psychoanalysis and PTSD theories suggest 
that extremely negative contents may cause memory distortions characterized 
by an impaired declarative memory for these events but pathological 
unconscious memories. The theories differ with respect to the relative 
contribution of the internal vs. external nature of the negative contents.
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reaction time as compared to stimuli which are in fact new, which 
could be interpreted as indirect evidence of an unconscious conflict 
during processing of these stimuli.
Alternative paradigms can take these critiques into account. In 
such paradigms, the process of repression should not be volun-
tarily controlled; instead, they should create a situation in which 
repression occurs automatically due to the emotional content of 
a stimulus. When the “repressed” stimuli are subsequently pre-
sented in a recognition memory test, it is hypothesized that they 
cannot be recalled consciously, but that they continue to exert an 
unconscious influence on the subject’s behavior, as indicated by a 
measure of unconscious memory. In addition, however, there is a 
more general problem with the existing paradigms that are meant 
to operationalize repression, because they measure memory as an 
impairment of successful recall, but do not investigate whether 
memories are successfully integrated into the self. In other words, 
the constructive nature of successful memories is not taken into 
account. In the next two sections, we will explain such a con-
structivist concept of memory, which is particularly relevant for 
autobiographical memorizing (Storage and Constructive Models 
of Memory) and is impaired in trauma-related memory distor-
tions (Trauma-Related Memory Distortions Due to Lack of Self-
Referential Processing). Finally, we will describe paradigms which 
are suited to capture memory distortions related to repression of 
conflicts (Promising Approaches for Studying Memory Distortions 
Due to Repression).
storage and constructIve Models of MeMory
In the cognitive neurosciences, memory is most often conceptual-
ized as the process of stimulus encoding, storage, and retrieval. 
In this framework, memory recall involves an identical repetition 
of the original experiences – or, as Tulving (1983) described it 
in his famous definition of episodic memory, as a “mental time 
travel” back to the original situation. Accordingly, the neural 
correlates of memory are usually studied by analyzing “subse-
quent memory”-effects, i.e., differences in brain activation pat-
terns associated with the initial presentation of subsequently 
remembered as compared to forgotten items. However, this 
storage model of memory only captures one relevant dimen-
sion of memory, which relies on the identity of encoded and 
remembered contents. In particular, it abstracts the specific func-
tion of memory retrieval for a subject. The cultural history of 
memory models has always consisted in a dichotomy of such 
storage models of memory on the one hand, models of construc-
tive memory on the other hand (Assmann, 2002). Constructive 
concepts of memory as re-interpretation of events were, e.g., 
investigated experimentally by Bartlett (1932). In a number of 
studies, he presented his British subjects a short story, “The War 
of the Ghosts,” which contains several seemingly illogical and 
irrational elements. When subjects were afterward asked to recall 
the story in as many details as possible, they modified it accord-
ing to their own cultural schemata; illogical elements were thus 
replaced by more coherent narratives. These studies illustrate 
the constructive nature of memory retrieval and suggest that 
memory is not only designed to retrieve events exactly as they 
happened, but supports specific functions in the interaction with 
the (internal or external) environment.
terms – possibly a modern replacement of the Freudian “metapsy-
chology,” which was deeply grounded in late nineteenth century 
neurophysiological knowledge (e.g., Stephan, 2002).
experIMental paradIgMs of repressIon
Cognitive neuroscience studies on repression have established two 
main experimental paradigms which aim at investigating repres-
sion in normal healthy subjects, the “Directed forgetting” and the 
“Think/No-Think” paradigm (Johnson, 1994; Anderson and Green, 
2001; Erdelyi, 2006). In these paradigms, forgetting is consciously 
and intentionally controlled by the participants, who are explic-
itly asked to voluntarily inhibit randomly selected subsets of items 
or “not to think” of them: “On some trials they (i.e., the partici-
pants) were instructed to think of the previously learned picture; 
on other trials they were instructed not to let the previously asso-
ciated picture enter consciousness.” (Think/No-Think paradigm, 
Depue et al., 2007). One might wonder whether these paradigms 
are actually aimed at investigating the psychoanalytical process of 
repression. However, this is explicitly stated; for example, the article 
by Anderson et al. (2004) using the Think/No-Think paradigm 
starts with the phrases: “Over a century ago, Freud proposed that 
unwanted memories can be excluded from awareness, a process 
called repression. It is unknown, however, how repression occurs 
in the brain.” (p. 232). In both paradigms, the instructions reliably 
lead to a decreased proportion of stimuli in the “voluntarily forgot-
ten” condition which can be recalled in a subsequent declarative 
memory test. The functional MRI results show a reduced BOLD 
response in the hippocampus and an increased activity in the lateral 
prefrontal cortex, which was interpreted as index for a recruit-
ment of inhibitory executive control processes. However, for three 
reasons we argue that these paradigms do not adequately opera-
tionalize the clinical process of repression. First, repression occurs 
specifically in situations which overload the executive processing 
capacities. During real repression, voluntary control is lacking; a 
person represses an experience because this experience induces 
an unbearable conflict. Therefore, attempting to induce repres-
sion by a recruitment of executive control processes is paradoxical. 
The process investigated by Anderson and colleagues can more 
precisely be termed “suppression,” the voluntary “forgetting,” or 
“keeping down” of unwanted content. Second, if the mechanism of 
repression is considered in isolation, it appears as if the contents of 
repression are only secondary. However, repression does not occur 
with regard to random situations or stimuli, but only if an intense 
negative emotion is evoked. Thus, repression should be automati-
cally induced by the experimental stimuli. Third, an experimental 
paradigm of repression should not only reduce conscious access 
to “repressed” stimuli, but also exclude that these stimuli are just 
forgotten. In fact, it should even be shown that unconscious mem-
ory for these items is enhanced: The concept of repression was 
introduced to explain clinical symptoms by experiences which are 
not consciously accessible for the patients, but which continue to 
exert an unconscious influence. Thus, in a non-declarative, implicit 
memory test, an increased proportion of these stimuli should be 
“remembered,” as shown in PTSD patients (e.g., McNally, 1997). 
For example, these stimuli may be erroneously classified as “new” 
during conscious recollection (because no conscious memory exists 
for them), but this (incorrect) response may be given with a delayed 
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the selective nature of encoding and retrieval, they do not require 
that experiences be integrated into a coherent and acceptable per-
sonal history for memory to be successful.
Recall of autobiographical memory is a prototypical example 
of a reconstructive memory process. Depending on situational 
requirements and personal aims, recollection of a personal expe-
rience serves specific functions. The main criterion for successful 
autobiographical memory recall is not whether a situation is exactly 
reproduced; instead, as it is one of the main functions of autobio-
graphical memories to serve the construction of a coherent and 
acceptable self-image, these memories have to fit into a coherent 
construction of the past – for this reason, the subjects in Bartlett’s 
studies modified the story according to their cultural expectations. 
Several more recent studies provide experimental evidence for this 
view. First, it has been shown in cross-cultural studies that auto-
biographical memory is influenced by the emphasis which is put in 
each culture on the self and on a unique life story (Nelson, 2003). 
Second, in each culture, autobiographical memory recall depends 
on an individual’s current view of herself/himself, and serves the 
construction of a coherent and positive self (Wilson and Ross, 
2003). For example, as improving selves are particularly gratifying 
(e.g., Frijda, 1988), subjects tend to view their own past abilities as 
inferior than their current abilities, and as lower than they viewed 
them before (Conway and Ross, 1984). Third, it was shown that 
the reported number of autobiographical memory recalls which 
aimed at creating self-continuity was higher in subjects with low 
degrees of self-concept clarity (corresponding to low levels of per-
ceived self coherence), suggesting that autobiographical memory 
recall indeed served to strengthen self coherence (Bluck and Alea, 
2008). Fourth, brain lesions which induce a loss of autobiographi-
cal memory may also lead to an impairment of the sense of one’s 
self (Schacter, 1996).
The functions of autobiographical memory retrieval have been 
described in a review by Bluck (2003). First, memorizing serves 
the creation of a continuous identity: “[T]hough we often think of 
memory as a series of events, it is also a record of a series of selves, 
or a record of the self across time, an autobiography.” (Bluck, 2003, 
p. 12). Second, memory is relevant for the creation and maintenance 
of social interactions: Often, personal statements are being justi-
fied by referring to autobiographical events, and a common past is 
created by evocation of situations that were experienced together. 
Finally, autobiographical memories serve a directive function, as 
they allow one to predict what will happen in the future and which 
actions will likely lead to the desired outcomes.
Cognitive neuroscience studies on the neuronal correlates of 
autobiographical memory recall support the view that this type 
of memory involves the construction of a self-image. These stud-
ies revealed an increased activation of both the hippocampus 
and the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) during processing of 
self-related autobiographical information (Cabeza et al., 2004; 
Summerfield et al., 2009). Activation of the mPFC was associated 
with self-referential processes, for example during presentation of 
photographs that subjects had taken themselves as compared to 
photographs taken by other subjects (Cabeza et al., 2004) or dur-
ing evaluation whether adjectives could be attributed to oneself 
instead of to another person (Gutchess et al., 2007). The theory that 
autobiographical memory depends on an integration of declarative 
Several current memory theories have incorporated aspects 
of such a constructive account on memory and also highlighted 
the relevance of self-referential processing. According to these 
views, it is not exact representations of external events that are 
encoded and retrieved, but the results from internal process-
ing, evaluation, and interpretation of these events. For example, 
the theory of transfer-appropriate processing (TAP) interprets 
learning as re-performing a previous act, i.e., successful learn-
ing is an appropriate transfer of underlying structures rather 
than an access of a memory trace (Morris et al., 1977; Bransford 
et al., 1979; Baddeley, 2002). According to TAP, recall is facilitated 
by similarity between the encoding and the retrieval state; this 
effect is related to both environmental contexts (e.g., if encod-
ing occurred in the library of the Psychology Department, recall 
will also be easier at that place) and internal variables such as 
current affective states and goals (events encoded in a sad mood 
will also be most likely retrieved in a sad mood). In addition, 
many studies investigated the effects of encoding conditions 
related to self-referential processing, e.g., by instructing sub-
jects to rate the pleasantness of items (Hunt and Einstein, 1981; 
McDaniel and Einstein, 1993). Such effects have been described, 
e.g., in the framework of the levels of processing theory (Craik 
and Lockhardt, 1972). Furthermore, several experimental para-
digms have investigated why events which have never happened 
are “recalled” (the false memory paradigm; see, e.g., Deese, 1959; 
Roediger III and McDermott, 1995), and why actual events are 
forgotten (e.g., retrieval-induced forgetting paradigms, Anderson 
et al., 1994; Macrae and MacLeod, 1999; Caroll et al., 2007). 
None of these theories and paradigms assumes a simple storage 
model of memory. Instead, they capture aspects of a constructive 
memory theory because they emphasize that memory encoding 
and retrieval depend on the construction of an integrated experi-
ence and the evaluation of its personal relevance. Furthermore, 
recall can be considered a “reconstruction” because it depends 
on the situational context during which it occurs.
However, there is a fundamental difference between these 
accounts and constructivist memory theories in a narrower sense, 
which is the criterion for successful memory: In storage models 
of memory, recall is successful if it recapitulates crucial aspects of 
a previous experience; according to constructivist memory theo-
ries, however, recall is successful if it allows the recalling person 
to build a coherent narrative about his/her past. Imagine that 
two people experience the same event, but afterward report two 
inconsistent versions of this event. According to the storage model 
of memory, there are objective criteria whether the report of the 
first or the second person is correct. In contrast, the constructive 
memory theory would assume that both reports may be correct 
as long as subjective coherence is achieved. This view differs con-
siderably from paradigms such as the false memory paradigm, the 
retrieval-induced forgetting paradigm, or paradigms of voluntary 
memory suppression such as the “think/no-think” or “directed for-
getting” paradigms: These paradigms investigate the conditions 
under which memory storage fails, but not the conditions under 
which a successful transformation into an acceptable narrative, 
and integration with self-referential processes, succeed. Similarly, 
even though theories such as the TAP theory or models such as the 
Adaptive Control of Thought model (Anderson, 1976) emphasize 
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The effect of dissociation on the development of trauma-related 
memory distortions was studied in healthy control subjects by use 
of the trauma film paradigm (for an overview of this method, see 
Holmes and Bourne, 2008). This paradigm builds on observations 
that intrusive thoughts do not only occur in PTSD patients, but also 
in many situations of everyday life after strong emotional events 
(Berntsen, 1996; Mace, 2005). In the trauma film paradigm, intru-
sions are induced by a movie which contains emotionally disturbing 
scenes (e.g., scenes of victims from car accidents). This paradigm 
has already been used in a number of studies and reliably induces 
intrusive memories, which disappear after a few weeks (of course, 
ethical reasons prohibit the induction of an actual PTSD which is 
defined by the persistence of symptoms, after a trauma, for more 
than a month). In addition to intrusions, declarative memory for 
the contents of the trauma film is impaired (Brewin, 2007; Jones 
et al., 2007). Using this paradigm, it was shown that spontaneously 
occurring states of dissociation predicted subsequent intrusions 
(Holmes et al., 2004; Kindt et al., 2005). However, any attempts to 
increase intrusion incidence by experimentally induced dissocia-
tion failed (e.g., Holmes et al., 2007), suggesting that dissociation 
may affect memory distortions via an underlying psychological or 
physiological process, which is not triggered by the experimentally 
induced dissociation – e.g., via reduced activation of brain regions 
supporting self-referential processing.
The neural basis of memory effects in the trauma film paradigm 
was investigated in two recent functional MRI studies (Henckens 
et al., 2009; van Marle et al., 2009). Physiological parameters as 
well as subjective reports confirmed that stress was induced by 
segments of a distressing movie. In the first study, IAPS pictures 
were presented interleaved with these segments and brain activ-
ity related to declarative encoding of IAPS pictures was analyzed 
(Henckens et al., 2009). In contrast to the impairment of declarative 
memory for traumatic events observed clinically, the authors found 
that stress increased subsequent recollection of pictures. However, 
hippocampal activity was reduced during successful encoding of 
images under stress, suggesting that memory formation required a 
hippocampal-independent mechanism. These results are therefore 
consistent with the dual representation theory and suggest that a 
high stress level shifts encoding from a hippocampus-dependent 
to an amygdala-dependent encoding mechanism (Brewin, 2003), 
although no implicit memory tests were performed, and thus the 
exact memory processes contributing to the stress-induced memory 
enhancement could not be resolved. In line with this interpretation, 
the second study showed increased responsiveness of the amygdala 
to facial stimuli presented interleaved with the movie, although 
memory for these items was not tested (van Marle et al., 2009). 
Further research using the trauma film paradigm will be extremely 
useful to test predictions from the dual representation theory more 
directly: First, it will be interesting to test memory for the movie 
segments themselves (instead of interleaved stimuli). Second, not 
only declarative memory but also intrusions should be captured 
using the diary method (Brewin and Saunders, 2001; Bisby et al., 
2009); i.e., intrusions during the weeks following the experiment 
should be collected by diaries given to the participants. Finally – 
and maybe most importantly – the effects of dissociation during 
the movie should be investigated. As described above, it appears 
to be extremely difficult to induce dissociation by experimental 
memory and self-referential processes is depicted in Figure 1B. It 
should be noted, however, that reverse inference from activation of 
a given region during one experimental condition to mental proc-
esses occurring in this condition may be problematic because these 
activations are usually not unequivocal (for reviews on the validity 
of this inference see Henson, 2005; Axmacher et al., 2009).
While constructive concepts of memory exerted a strong influ-
ence on research in social psychology, most studies in the cogni-
tive neurosciences (apart from autobiographical memory studies) 
followed the storage model. This is particularly problematic in 
the case of memory distortions due to repression and dissocia-
tion: Memory, conceptualized as a constructive process, serves 
to build personal identities. In contrast, repressed conflicts and 
traumatic events cannot become part of this personal identity; 
their subjective meaning is not re-evaluated and integrated into 
a narrative continuity with other events, but remains restricted 
to the situation when these events were experienced. Repressed 
conflicts and traumatic events remain permanently present in 
a pathological sense – they cannot be forgotten or temporarily 
dismissed. Thus, the case of memory distortions shows that con-
structive memory and storage memory are not only alternative 
concepts of memory, but are actually directly opposing each other 
in some respects. In the following two paragraphs, we describe 
further evidence for this view and present promising paradigms 
for the investigation of trauma-related and repression-related 
memory distortions.
trauMa-related MeMory dIstortIons due to lack of 
self-referentIal processIng
Several observations suggest that what is central for trauma-related 
memory distortions is not the lack of a memory for a traumatizing 
situation per se, but the lack of an integration of this memory with 
self-referential processes. First, during traumatic events, subjects 
may lose their sense of agency, i.e., they do not feel themselves 
as autonomous human beings but just as observers. Dissociation 
during the traumatic event is predictive for subsequent memory 
impairments and also for the development of PTSD – even more 
than trauma severity is (Maercker et al., 2000; Ozer et al., 2003). 
Second, PTSD patients often describe that the traumatic scenes are 
remembered from a detached view outside of themselves (Brewin 
and Saunders, 2001; Bohleber, 2008). Thus, they also recall them-
selves as lacking self-referential processing during the trauma. 
Third, loss of agency during traumatic events may also explain 
why traumatic events cannot only induce PTSD, but also a complex 
PTSD (Herman, 1992) or developmental trauma disorder (van der 
Kolk, 2005) which both involve changes to the self-image and an 
impaired feeling of identity. Finally, flashbacks can be understood 
as a dissociative re-living of the traumatic situation, i.e., re-living 
in a state of depersonalization and derealization (Maercker, 2009). 
Taken together, these considerations suggest that traumatic events 
mainly impair the integration of experiences with the internal 
perception and valuation of these events, and that the resulting 
memory distortions need to be conceptualized within a construc-
tive memory framework (Figure 1C).
How can the reduced self-referential processing during trau-
matic experiences, with the resulting impairment in the construc-
tion of memories for these events, be assessed experimentally? 
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behavioral result of the hypothesized repression – resistance against 
revelation of these contents – can be confirmed experimentally by 
an increase in skin conductance response (SCR) and reaction times. 
The link between repression and the hypothesized increase in skin 
conductance is an indirect one: It is known that psychological arousal 
(activation) leads to increased skin conductance (Lang et al., 1995). 
Clinical experience suggests that patients may show increased signals 
of stress and arousal when repressing critical contents (Person et al., 
2005). Thus, it is assumed that repression may be operationalized by 
increases in skin conductance. Next, the same list is presented again, 
but now subjects are not asked to name a new word by free association, 
but to recall the word they have initially generated. Finally, all initially 
associated words are presented again, and subjects are instructed to 
indicate the emotional valence and intensity of these words (as an 
indicator of conscious emotional content). In contrast to the often 
described increase in declarative memory for negative emotional mate-
rial (Heuer and Reisberg, 1990; Bradley et al., 1992; Christianson, 1992; 
Ochsner, 2000; Buchanan and Lovallo, 2001; Kensinger and Corkin, 
2003), this paradigm reliably results in an impaired memory for words 
whose initial generation is associated with physiological signs of resist-
ance (increase in skin conductance and reaction times) and which are 
subsequently rated as emotionally negative (Levinger and Clark, 1961; 
Köhler and Wilke, 1999; Köhler et al., 2002). In particular, Levinger 
and Clark (1961) found that high SCRs during association predicted 
failure of subsequent recall. Furthermore, recall was worse for words 
which were afterward labeled as emotional as compared to words 
modifications. Therefore, dissociation could be measured on the 
neural level, by a reduced activation of regions supporting self-
referential processing.
proMIsIng approaches for studyIng MeMory 
dIstortIons due to repressIon
The neural signature of self-referential processing during memory 
recall can be used as a measure of successful reconstructive recall – or 
the lack thereof – not only in the trauma film paradigm, but also in 
paradigms investigating memory distortions due to repression. In one 
important paradigm (see Figure 3), which was initially suggested by 
Jung (1918), words in a list are presented consecutively and subjects 
are instructed to generate an associated word to each word in the list 
using the psychoanalytical technique of “free association” – i.e., they 
are asked to say the first word which comes into their mind. The idea 
of “free association” is rooted in Freud’s psychoanalytical technique: 
When patients with neurotic symptoms say spontaneously what comes 
to their minds, they may eventually reveal material that can be linked by 
a skilled therapist to repressed conflicts which lead to or maintain their 
symptoms (Freud, 1913). The clinical usefulness of this technique has 
been shown many times (e.g., Person et al., 2005). According to Freud 
(1913), patients typically start to repress spontaneous thoughts once 
they may link to conflicts or memories that have to be kept unconscious. 
In Jung’s (1918) original experiment, the process of “free association” is 
believed to reveal contents that are primarily unconscious but relevant 
for the subjects because they may be related to repressed conflicts. The 
Figure 3 | repression of self-generated emotional words. (A) Presentation of cue words, participants were instructed to speak out loudly the first word which came to 
their minds while skin conductance response (SCR) and reaction latencies were recorded. (B) At memory test, the same cue words were presented again, and participants 
had to recall the word which they previously associated with the cue word during phase (A) of the experiment. (C) Emotional rating of the self-generated words.
Table 1 | experimental paradigms for studying memory distortions.
Paradigm Automatic implicit memory Declarative memory Self-referential 
 stimulus effects? enhanced? impaired? processing considered?
Directed forgetting;  No ? (not tested) Yes No 
Think/No-Think
Trauma film paradigm Yes Yes (intrusions) Yes Yes (dissociation)
Levinger/Clark/Köhler (Figure 3) Yes Yes (reaction times) Yes Yes (subject-specific cues)
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difficult to recall the initially associated word. In fact, Levinger and 
Clark found that forgotten words had higher response entropies than 
remembered words. However, partial correlations revealed that emo-
tion and response entropy contributed independently to memory.
Several shortcomings of the study by Levinger and Clark (1961) 
should be noted. First, recall was only tested immediately after initial 
associations, leaving open the possibility that it does not induce sus-
tained effects on memory. Second, reaction times as another possible 
measure of resistance toward revelation of repressed conflicts were 
not tested. In a follow-up study designed to overcome these short-
comings, Köhler and Wilke (1999) conduced a similar experiment, 
but (1) also measured reaction times during initial association, (2) 
asked subjects to recall the associated words not only directly after the 
association, but again after one week. They found that increased SCRs 
and reaction times during association as well as emotional ratings 
predicted both immediate forgetting and forgetting after 1 week.
To our knowledge, this paradigm has never been used for cogni-
tive neuroscience experiments. However, the dual representation 
theory (Brewin, 2003) predicts that generation of subsequently for-
gotten words is associated with increased amygdala and decreased 
hippocampal activation, and a negative correlation of activity in 
these regions. Furthermore, based on the idea that repression is 
related to reduction in self-referential processing, we would expect 
that generation of these words leads to decreased activation of the 
mPFC, and to a reduced functional connectivity between this region 
and the hippocampus.
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